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Abstract

This paper interrogates the theory and practice of parliamentary supremacy in Tanzania. We examine the assertion that, on becoming independent, Tanzania inherited the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy enshrined in the Westminster model. Using a historical approach, the paper analyzes the relationship between the legislature and the executive branch of government from 1926 to 2010, and concludes that the notion of parliamentary supremacy in Tanzania has remained more rhetorical. In theory the parliament is supreme, but at the level of practice its role has mainly been confined to the law-making and advisory functions with limited scope for the exercise of the oversight role. The paper identifies four factors that have tended to undermine the parliament’s sovereignty and its oversight role: the colonial legacy, i.e., the institutional framework that this legacy bequeathed; the composition of the parliament; the personality of institutional leadership; and the factor of executive defiance. The paper contends that unless the provisions of Articles 55(4), 62(1) and 67(1)(b) are revised to undo the present fusion of the executive branch of government and the parliament as well as invalidate the powers solely granted to political parties to determine who should or should not contest elections, these will continue to undermine not only the ability of the parliament to oversee the executive branch, but also the principle of separation of powers.

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