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Abstract

The legislature plays a pivotal role in overseeing the management of public resources through the budget process, which provides a formal forum for debating how funds are mobilised, allocated, and spent. Through this process, the legislature reviews and amends the laws governing a government’s annual revenues and expenditures. However, legislative review is often shaped by underlying political dynamics. Focusing on legislative-executive relations, this article examines the political dynamics that unfolded in Tanzania’s parliament during the amendment of the Cashew Nut Industry Act (Cap. 203) and how these dynamics produced parliamentary gridlock. It further explores how the fusion of party and executive power can be weaponised to discipline political rivals. The study reveals that partisan politics, reinforced by formal and factional rules within the ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), significantly unfolded during the amendment of the Act and the subsequent monopolisation of the cashew market. It argues that constitutional weaknesses, single-party dominance, presidential power concentration, and internal CCM factionalism collectively shaped the outcomes of the amendment process. To strengthen legislative independence and institutional resilience, the study recommends legal and structural reforms such as establishing independent electoral management bodies and allowing legislators to cross the floor without losing their seats.

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